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Abstract
We examine the interaction between vote-share contracts and learning-by-doing.
Candidates for a political oﬃce are allowed to oﬀer vote-share thresholds. The
elected politician has to achieve at least this threshold value in his reelection
result to remain in oﬃce for a second term. We assume there are learning-
by-doing eﬀects for incumbents and show that competition leads to vote-share
contracts implementing the socially optimal threshold, which is above one-half.
Vote-share contracts improve the average ability level of a reelected politician and
increase eﬀort in the ﬁrst term of an incumbent. On the other hand, vote-share
contracts reduce the probability that learning-by-doing takes place. However,
the overall eﬀect of vote-share contracts is welfare-enhancing, even under the
assumption of learning-by-doing.
Keywords: elections, political contracts, vote-share thresholds, learning-by-
doing eﬀects, incumbency advantage.
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There exists a large empirical evidence for above-average success of incumbents in
reelection results.1 Such incumbency advantages will be socially detrimental if they
lead to the reelection of a politician with ability below average. On the other hand,
there also exists an incumbency advantage beneﬁcial for society: The learning-by-
doing eﬀects while being in oﬃce may result in higher ability and/or higher eﬀort of
the incumbent in the next period.
In this paper, we propose that candidates who compete for oﬃce should be allowed to
oﬀer vote-share contracts that diminish the incumbency advantage. Such a contract
contains a vote-share threshold which may be above one-half or equal to one-half.2 In
the next reelection, the elected politician has to achieve this threshold value at least to
stay in oﬃce for a further term. Thus, by increasing the reelection hurdle vote-share
contracts are an instrument to eliminate welfare-reducing incumbency advantages. We
show that this positive aspect of vote-share contracts is not outweighed by the negative
aspect brought up by the diminution of socially beneﬁcial learning-by-doing eﬀects.
A higher reelection hurdle than one-half might have several eﬀects. The incumbent
might exert higher eﬀort in order to improve his reelection chances. On the other
hand, a high vote-share threshold might result in a lower eﬀort choice of an incum-
bent if his reelection chances get too small. Furthermore, vote-share contracts might
reduce the reelection probability of the incumbent. This might be beneﬁcial if the
reelection chances of an incumbent with an ability level below average get smaller. On
the other hand, a lower reelection probability would be socially detrimental if a high
vote-share threshold causes the deselection of an incumbent with ability above aver-
age. Finally, a lower reelection probability caused by vote-share contracts means that
socially beneﬁcial learning-by-doing eﬀects will occur less often.
1See e.g. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002), who document advantages for state executives and
legislators in the United States. Moreover, it is shown in their paper that incumbency advantages
have become more inﬂuential over time.
2Oﬀering a vote-share contract with a vote-share threshold of exactly one-half would be equivalent
to the usually applied system of majority voting.
2We use a simple two-period model in order to show that competition for vote-share con-
tracts induces the candidates to oﬀer voluntarily vote-share thresholds above one-half.
If learning-by-doing eﬀects are rather small, the introduction of vote-share contracts
increases overall eﬀort of the incumbent in our model. If learning-by-doing eﬀects
are rather large, introducing vote-share contracts increases the expected ability of the
oﬃce-holder in the second period. Total welfare is increasing for all sizes of learning-
by-doing eﬀects if vote-share contracts are introduced.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we present the
related literature. We introduce our basic model in section 3. In section 4 we derive the
results in the benchmark case with elections only. We analyze the results in a scenario
with vote-share contracts and elections in section 5. In section 6 we examine the eﬀect
of vote-share contracts on public welfare. Section 7 contains several extensions of our
basic model. Finally, section 8 concludes. The Appendix contains the proofs.
2 Related Literature
The paper most closely related to this one is Gersbach (2007), where the concept of
vote-share contracts is proposed to alleviate negative aspects of incumbency advan-
tage. In contrast to our paper, incumbency advantages have solely negative eﬀects in
Gersbach (2007). We show in our paper that the welfare-enhancing eﬀect of vote-share
contracts still holds when incumbency advantages also have positive aspects.
Vote-share contracts are one particular type of political contracts, which are veriﬁable
election promises associated with remunerations or sanctions, depending on whether
these promises are kept or not. Political contracts have to be certiﬁed by an indepen-
dent body as they are subordinated to the rules of liberal democracy, i.e. political
contracts have to be consistent with the fundamental values of democracy. There
is some recent literature on political contracts (see e.g. Gersbach (2004a), Gersbach
(2005), Gersbach and M¨ uller (2006), and Gersbach and Liessem (2008)). Note that
vote-share contracts feature one great advantage, compared to other types of political
3contracts: They allow to tackle multi-task problems as success or failure of the incum-
bent depends not only on the tasks recorded in contract, but on overall performance
which is crucial for reaching the vote-share threshold.
Vote-share contracts may also be seen as a special form of ﬂexible majority rule. This
concept is introduced in Gersbach (2004b). Under a ﬂexible majority rule, the required
majority depends on the voting issue. However, the majority threshold under a ﬂexible
majority rule is set by an institution not involved in the voting process, whereas in the
case of vote-share contracts, the threshold value is proposed by the politicians running
for oﬃce. Nevertheless, vote-share contracts are positioned in the interface of political
contracts and ﬂexible majority rules.
Finally, there exists a large literature on above-average success of oﬃce-holders in
reelection results.3 Several reasons are proposed in the literature for the existence of
incumbency advantages.
First, we look at the case where candidates are ex ante homogeneous (i.e. before
one of them is in oﬃce) and diﬀer only with regard to their being incumbent or new
candidate. Many advantages of incumbents may accrue from having already been in
oﬃce: Campaigns are less expensive for incumbents, e.g. due to greater media cover-
age and face-recognition eﬀects (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2000) and Prior
(2006)), and in addition incumbents may have better access to campaign funds (Gerber
(1988)). Next, vote decisions may be inﬂuenced by the endorsement from respected
elites, to which oﬃce-holders have easier access (Grossman and Helpman (1999)). Fur-
thermore, incumbents may increase their reelection chances by providing constituency
services (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1987)) and socially costly actions (Rogoﬀ and
Sibert (1988), Alesina and Cukierman (1990), Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001), and
Cukierman and Tommasi (1998)). Finally, the incumbent may have increased his value
for society by improving his skills during his time in oﬃce. This process of enlarging
3See e.g. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008) or Gordon and Landa (2009) for a recent
discussion of the literature.
4capabilities is explained by learning-by-doing eﬀects (Arrow (1962)).4 Similarly, incum-
bents may have a larger value for the inhabitants of their district, due to the principle
of seniority, which means that the agenda-setting power of politicians increases with
experience (McKelvey and Riezman (1992)). Thus, the incumbent will tend to be more
successful in reaping beneﬁts for his district and – as rational voters anticipate this ef-
fect – he will have higher reelection chances. Note that while learning-by-doing eﬀects
for politicians are assumed to be beneﬁcial for the whole society, the eﬀects of seniority
will normally be beneﬁcial only for a speciﬁc part of the population, while they will
tend to be detrimental for society as a whole.5
Second, there may be further forms of incumbency advantage when politicians are
ex ante heterogeneous, which means that they diﬀer beyond the dimension of their
being incumbents or new candidates. There may be an ex ante quality diﬀerence
and incumbents may have higher quality due to electoral selection (Samuelson (1984),
Londregan and Romer (1993), Banks and Sundaram (1998), Zaller(1998), Ashworth
(2005), Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005), and Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita
(2008)), or politicians may diﬀer with respect to their ideological position. Then there
might exist a pro-incumbent district partisan bias, as the ideological characteristics of
a district will be relatively stable and hence, the incumbent may have an advantage
against challengers with a diﬀerent ideological position (Gelman and King (1990)).
Third, even for candidates being equal in their expectation value, there may exist an
incumbency advantage, as risk-averse voters may prefer the incumbent to an unknown
challenger (Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985), Anderson and Glomm (1992)).
Finally, there may be a further reason for the higher reelection probability of incum-
bents, which stems from strategic entry into the election game: Challengers may be
deterred from running against incumbents with high quality (Cox and Katz (1996),
4Arrow does not explicitly consider learning-by-doing eﬀects of politicians, but analyzes the eco-
nomic implications of learning-by-doing in general. However, his view that “Learning is the product
of experience (...) and therefore only takes place during activity” is the same perspective of learning-
by-doing than the one we have in mind in this paper.
5Under this perspective, the seniority argument seems to be related to the incumbency advantage
accruing from providing constituency services and socially costly actions.
5Stone, Maisel and Maestas (2004), and Gordon, Huber and Landa (2007)), while in-
cumbents facing a likely defeat may retire strategically (Jacobson and Kernell (1983)).
In this paper, we will only model two forms of incumbency advantage, namely socially
costly actions and socially beneﬁcial learning-by-doing eﬀects. Nevertheless, as our
model includes positive and negative aspects of incumbency advantages this way of
proceeding allows to analyze the welfare eﬀects of introducing vote-share contracts.
3 The Model
The model draws on Gersbach (2007). We use a similar notation to allow an easy
comparison of the results. There are two periods, denoted by t = 1,2.
3.1 Agents and Incumbency Advantage
We assume that there is a continuum of voters indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Voters elect one
politician at the beginning of each period. There are two candidates, denoted by k or
k′ ∈ [L,R], where L (R) is a left (right) wing politician. At both election dates, the
same two candidates compete for oﬃce. The victorious candidate of the ﬁrst election
may have a twofold incumbency advantage at the second election date:
• Due to learning-by-doing eﬀects, the incumbent is of higher competence, which
is a socially beneﬁcial kind of incumbency advantage.
• An incumbent k may shift some part of the output to period 2, which will only
be realized if he is still in oﬃce in t = 2. This type of incumbency advantage is
socially detrimental for two reasons in our model frame. If there is a new oﬃce-
holder k′ in t = 2, then the shifted amount of output is totally lost. If k is still
in oﬃce in t = 2, we assume that some part of the shifted output will get lost.
63.2 Policies and Utilities
The elected politician has to decide on three policies.
• Ideological Policy: I
The incumbent decides in both periods on a one-dimensional ideological policy
I ∈ [0,1]. Voters are ordered according to their ideal points such that i is the
ideal point of voter i who is aﬀected by I with disutility −(ikt − i)2, where ikt is
the platform chosen by policy-maker k in period t.
• Public Project: P
The incumbent k undertakes a public project in both periods. We use gt to
denote the amount of project provided in period t. We assume that all voters are
homogeneous concerning the utility from the project and that gt is given as
gt = γ(ekt + ak),γ > 0, (1)
where ak denotes the ability of k, which is a random variable distributed uniformly
on [−A,A] with A > 0, while ekt stands for the eﬀort exerted by k in period t.
The incumbent incurs costs of C(ekt) from exerting eﬀort. C(ekt) = che2
kt if he is
in his ﬁrst term in oﬃce and C(ekt) = cle2
kt during the second term. We assume
that ch > cl > 0, i.e. there are learning-by-doing eﬀects.6 As the amount of
public project depends on the eﬀort and thus on the eﬀort costs, there may be
diﬀerent policy outcomes, depending on whether the incumbent is in his ﬁrst or
his second term in oﬃce. We will denote the amount of public project provided
in the ﬁrst term by gt(ch) and the amount provided in the second term by gt(cl).
• Output-shift Policy: O
The incumbent can shift the realization of a ﬁxed amount ∆ > 0 of the output
from period t = 1 to period t = 2 if γ(ek1 + ak) > ∆. If the incumbent shifts ∆
6Alternatively, one could model learning-by-doing eﬀects by modifying the ability parameter ak,
such that ak increases when a politician enters his second term in oﬃce. Using this model framework
instead of our approach using a high/low eﬀort-cost parameter would not change the results.
7to the next period, then the realized output in period t = 1 will be reduced to
γ(ek1 +ak)−∆. If the politician is still in oﬃce in t = 2, output f∆ (0 < f < 1)
is realized in t = 2 due to the output shift, while in the case of a new oﬃce-holder
in t = 2, the shifted output is totally lost. We use ǫk to denote the output-shift
decision of candidate k with ǫk = 1 if policy-maker k shifts output in period 1,
and ǫk = 0 otherwise. Policy option O represents a policy that requires relation-
speciﬁc investments and enables the incumbent to determine the time of output
realization. Examples from the executive branch are international treaties or
foreign policy that require policy-speciﬁc human capital that may be lost in the
case of a government change. The output-shift option is a simple means to
generate a socially detrimental aspect of incumbency advantage.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that voters and politicians have a discount factor
equal to 1.7 We use Vi( , ) to denote the lifetime utility of voter i depending on who
is in oﬃce in t = 1 and t = 2. For example, Vi(L,R) denotes lifetime utility of i, given
that L holds oﬃce in t = 1, while R is incumbent in t = 2. There are four cases:
• Vi(R,R) = g1(ch) − ǫR∆ − (iR1 − i)2 + g2(cl) + ǫRf∆ − (iR2 − i)2,
• Vi(R,L) = g1(ch) − ǫR∆ − (iR1 − i)2 + g2(ch) − (iL2 − i)2,
• Vi(L,R) = g1(ch) − ǫL∆ − (iL1 − i)2 + g2(ch) − (iR2 − i)2,
• Vi(L,L) = g1(ch) − ǫL∆ − (iL1 − i)2 + g2(cl) + ǫLf∆ − (iL2 − i)2.
The candidates derive utility from two sources:
• Beneﬁts from policies
Politicians derive the same beneﬁts from policies I and P as ordinary voters.
Candidate R’s most preferred point with regard to policy I is denoted by  R
with  R > 1
2. For ease of exposition, we assume that the candidates’ ideal points
7The extension to a discount factor smaller than 1 is straightforward.
8are symmetrically distributed around the median voter’s ideal point which is
located at one-half.8 Thus, candidate L’s ideal point  L is given by
 L = 1 −  R. (2)
• Oﬃce-holding
The incumbent derives private beneﬁts b from holding oﬃce, including his wage,
but also non-monetary beneﬁts like prestige or the satisfaction of being in power.
We use Vk( , ) to denote politician k’s lifetime utility depending on who is in oﬃce in
t = 1 and t = 2. We look at politician R, for example, and have to distinguish four
cases again:
• VR(R,R) = b − (iR1 −  R)2 − che2
R1 + g1(ch) − ǫR∆ + b − (iR2 −  R)2 − cle2
R2
+ g2(cl) + ǫRf∆,
• VR(R,L) = b − (iR1 −  R)2 − che2
R1 + g1(ch) − ǫR∆ − (iL2 −  R)2 + g2(ch),
• VR(L,R) = −(iL1 −  R)2 + g1(ch) − ǫL∆ + b − (iR2 −  R)2 − che2
R2 + g2(ch),
• VR(L,L) = −(iL1 −  R)2 + g1(ch) − ǫL∆ − (iL2 −  R)2 + g2(cl) + ǫLf∆.
3.3 Assumptions and Equilibrium Concept
Candidates are assumed not to be able to commit to a particular policy platform during
the election campaign. The incumbent will learn his own ability ak after he has exerted
ekt. Voters observe output gt, but as ability is assumed to remain private information
of the incumbent, voters are not able to distinguish how much of gt is due to eﬀort
and how much due to ability.9 Since output gt is not contractible, it cannot be used
8Note that there is no incumbency advantage due to ideological positions in our paper, although
candidates and voters diﬀer in their ideological opinion. However, as both candidates are symmetric to
the median voter with regard to their ideological position, there is no pro-incumbent district partisan
bias in our model
9This assumption is in line with Alesina and Tabellini (2007). However, note that although voters
are not able to observe the composition between eﬀort and ability, they may nevertheless be able to
infer it in equilibrium.
9to generate performance-related wages for politicians. The incumbent is assumed to
observe ak before he has to make his decision about shifting output. Thus, he can make
ǫk dependent on ak. We assume that voters observe the outcome of policies I and O
and that they vote sincerely, i.e. they vote for the candidate who generates a higher




γ < A to ensure that reelection
probability in equilibrium is smaller than 1. Finally, we make the assumption that b is
so large that candidates will always prefer to be in oﬃce. We are looking for perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game.
3.4 The Overall Game
We summarize the overall game in the following ﬁgure:
      Period 1                          Period 2
Election
decision
    Ability
 realization
Output−shift Reelection
    decision
Lower effort costs








   Output
    decision
   for a first−term
     office−holder
 Choice of 
 effort and
  platform
    Output
 realization
Figure 1: Time-line with elections alone
10Although the individual voter has no inﬂuence on the election outcome in the case of a continuum
of voters, it is optimal for the electorate to vote sincerely, as this is the only sensible strategy for
rational voters in a two-party system (see e.g. Austen-Smith (1989)).
104 Elections Alone
In this section, we examine the standard case without vote-share contracts and restate
the results of Gersbach (2007) in the context of our model frame. We assume that
the candidate with more votes is elected. If both candidates obtain the same share of
votes, the probability of each candidate winning is 1
2 in t = 1, while we assume that
the incumbent is reelected in the case of a tie in period two.
4.1 The Second Period
As candidates cannot commit to policy platforms, a policy-maker will choose his most
preferred platform in t = 2. The amount of public project in t = 2 depends on whether
the policy-maker is in his ﬁrst term (where he does not know his ability ak and where
he has a high eﬀort-cost parameter ch), or in his second term (where he knows his
ability ak and where he has a low cost parameter cl). In the Appendix, we show:
Proposition 1
Suppose, e.g., that candidate R is elected as oﬃce-holder for period 2. Then
(i) he will choose
α) i∗
R2 =  R and e∗
R2 =
γ
2cl if R has been in oﬃce in the ﬁrst period;
β) i∗
R2 =  R and e∗
R2 =
γ
2ch if R has not been in oﬃce in the ﬁrst period;
(ii) the expected utility of R at the beginning of period 2 is given by
α) V ∗
R2(R,R) = b +
γ2
4cl + γaR + ǫRf∆,
β) V ∗
R2(L,R) = b +
γ2
4ch.
4.2 The First Period
Both candidates win with probability 1
2 in the ﬁrst election, as the median voter is
indiﬀerent between them. Without loss of generality, we will assume throughout the
11remaining part of the paper that R is elected in the ﬁrst election. We obtain the
following Fact, which holds in every equilibrium with pure strategies:
Fact 1
Suppose that candidate R is elected as oﬃce-holder for period 1. Then
(i) he will choose iR1 =  R for policy I;
(ii) voters will perfectly infer his ability aR at the end of period 1.
Politician R cannot gain more votes in the second election by choosing iR1  =  R, as
voters know that he will choose his ideal point in period 2 anyway. Part (ii) follows
from the informational structure of the game. As the incumbent does not observe his
ability before he exerts eﬀort, in any pure strategy equilibrium, exactly one level of
eﬀort will be chosen, and expected by the voters. Any deviation of gt from the expected
eﬀort times γ will be interpreted correctly as variation in ability, since aR =
gt−γˆ e1
γ ,
where ˆ e1 denotes the public’s expectations about the incumbent’s eﬀort level in t = 1.
Now we want to derive the optimal behavior of the oﬃceholder concerning P and O in
t = 1. First, there may occur three cases regarding aR:
(i) Candidate R’s ability may be so high that he will be reelected even without
output-shift policy. Then he will choose ǫR = 0 and will be reelected. We use
p0(eR1, ˆ e1) to denote the probability the oﬃceholder assigns to this eventuality.
(ii) The incumbent may have an intermediate level of ability where he will be reelected
only if he shifts output (ǫR = 1). As b is suﬃciently high, the oﬃceholder will
choose the socially detrimental option ǫR = 1, which implies reelection. We use
p1(eR1, ˆ e1) to denote the incumbent’s estimate of the probability of this case.
(iii) If R’s ability is so low that he will never be reelected, irrespective of ǫR, then he
will choose ǫR = 0. The probability of this case is 1 − p0(eR1, ˆ e1) − p1(eR1, ˆ e1).
Second, we introduce   aR(eR1, ˆ e1) as candidate R’s expected level of ability, conditional
on the fact that he is reelected, and show in the Appendix:
12Fact 2
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Note that the probability of R being reelected, i.e. p0(eR1, ˆ e1)+p1(eR1, ˆ e1), increases in
eR1, as for a given expectation ˆ e1, the incumbent can improve the public’s estimate of
his ability by exerting more eﬀort. A more favorable evaluation of his ability increases
his reelection chances. However, the expected level of R’s ability, contingent on the
fact of his reelection, decreases with eR1 as an increase in eR1 implies that R will be
reelected even for lower levels of ability. Thus,   aR(eR1, ˆ e1) is lowered.
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In the Appendix, we show:
Proposition 2
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11Note that R is reelected with probability p0(eR1, ˆ e1) + p1(eR1, ˆ e1), while L becomes the new
incumbent with probability 1 − p0(eR1, ˆ e1) − p1(eR1, ˆ e1). With probability p1(eR1, ˆ e1), net losses
∆(1 − f) occur due to output-shift policies.

























In part (i) we observe how equilibrium eﬀort e∗
R1 depends on the parameters. A de-
selected politician has utility losses due to the distance from the ideological policy
of his opponent to his own ideal point and due to the fact that he has no private
beneﬁts from holding oﬃce in t = 2. Thus, the larger ( R −  L) and b, the higher
the eﬀort the politician is willing to invest. The higher A, the lower the marginal gain
in reelection chances when R increases eﬀort marginally. Hence, greater uncertainty
regarding quality will reduce eﬀort. The higher ch, the lower e∗
R1, as exerting more eﬀort
in period 1 gets more costly for the politician. The higher cl, the lower the learning-
by-doing eﬀects. This decreases the incumbency advantage and thus, the eﬀort exerted
in the ﬁrst period is higher. The impact of γ is more subtle. On the one hand, higher
γ increases the marginal value of higher eﬀort today and the value of oﬃce tomorrow,
which both raise e∗
R1. On the other hand, higher γ results in lower eﬀort, as the utility
of the opponent being in oﬃce in period 2 and the losses due to an incumbent with
lower ability than average being reelected are increasing. Part (ii) of the Proposition
reﬂects the incumbency advantage due to learning-by-doing eﬀects. The probability of
the incumbent to get reelected is larger than one-half, even without shifting output.
Part (iii) reﬂects the additional incumbency advantage due to the output-shift policy.
In the last step, we want to analyze the ineﬃciencies of the equilibrium results in the
ﬁrst period. In the Appendix, we show:
Fact 3















Thus, Proposition 2 reveals two types of ineﬃciency. First, with probability p1(e∗
R1,e∗
R1),
incumbents with an ability level below average shift output to ensure reelection. Sec-
ond, the average ability level of a reelected politician   aR(e∗
R1,e∗
R1) from equation (9) is
lower than the socially optimal average ability level from equation (11). In the follow-
ing, we will see that vote-share contracts can alleviate the second type of ineﬃciency
and can additionally increase the eﬀort of the incumbent in period 1. However, the
probability of the socially wasteful output-shift does not change if vote-share contracts
are introduced.
5 Results with Vote-Share Contracts
In this section, we examine the combination of democratic elections and vote-share
contracts, and restate the results of Gersbach (2007) in the context of our model frame.
5.1 Vote-Share Thresholds as Political Contracts
Each candidate k is allowed to oﬀer a vote-share contract, which occurs by stipulating
a vote-share threshold sk with 1
2 ≤ sk ≤ 1. If politician k takes over oﬃce in t = 1,
he must win a share of votes at least equal to sk at the next election date to remain
in oﬃce. Otherwise, the challenger k′ will take oﬃce. Hence, the incumbent faces a
self-imposed vote-share threshold in the election at the end of period 1. Throughout
the section, we assume that 2 R − 1 < Aγ, which ensures interior solutions.12 To give
a short summary, we display the two additions in the extended game, in comparison
to our basic model, in the following ﬁgure:
12Note that for 2µR − 1 > Aγ, the incumbent may renounce exerting high eﬀort, as his reelection
chances are too low if vote share thresholds are high.
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Figure 2: Changes in the time-line with elections and vote-share contracts
The ﬁrst change is the additional step where both candidates are allowed to oﬀer vote-
share contracts before the ﬁrst election decision takes place. Secondly, the result of
the reelection decision is used to check whether the oﬃce-holder has been successful in
reaching his vote-share threshold. The rest of the time-line is the same as in Figure 1
and is omitted here for the sake of clarity.
5.2 The Second and First Period
We denote the results in the scenario with vote-share contracts by the superscript V
and assume without loss of generalization that R is elected in t = 1 with a vote-share
threshold sR ≥ 1
2. In the second period, R will choose i∗V
R2 =  R and e∗V
R2 =
γ
2cl if he is
still in oﬃce, while a new oﬃce-holder L will choose i∗V




the results will remain the same as in Proposition 1. In the Appendix, we show that






















































(2 R − 1)(2sR − 1)
2γ
. (14)
These equations coincide with equations (3), (4) and (5) for sR = 1
2. The optimal
choice of eV
R1 is obtained by solving the optimization problem (6), where p0(eR1, ˆ e1),
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(2 R − 1)(2sR − 1)
2γ
. (17)
From part (i), we observe that for sR > 1
2, the equilibrium eﬀort level is higher,
compared to elections only. The intuition is that the marginal gain from higher eﬀort
is increasing with a higher vote-share threshold. From part (iii), we learn that the
probability for output-shift to occur is not reduced by the introduction of vote-share-
contracts. This is due to the fact that incumbents who learn that they have an ability
level where they will reach their reelection hurdle if and only if they shift output will still
choose the output-shift option. This intermediate ability range where the output-shift
option is chosen will be shifted compared to the scenario without vote-share contracts.
However, due to our assumption that ability is a uniformly distributed random variable,
the probability for output-shift to occur will not change. Finally, note that the average
17ability level of a reelected candidate, given by   aV
R(e∗V
R1,e∗V
R1), is increasing in sR. Thus,
larger vote shares increase the average ability of reelected incumbents.
5.3 Competition for Vote-Share Contracts
Now, we consider the initial stage when both candidates compete for oﬃce with vote-
share contracts. The ex ante optimal vote-share threshold from the perspective of the





















































L2 denotes the second-term equilibrium eﬀort of the left-wing candidate if he
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The Fact is proven in the Appendix. Note that the value of s∗ is decreasing in ch. A
larger value of ch means, ceteris paribus, that the learning-by-doing eﬀects are larger.
Thus, voters are more interested in having the same politician in oﬃce during both
periods and therefore the optimal vote-share, from the perspective of the median voter,
is lower. However, even for ch → ∞, the value of s∗ is larger than 1
2, which means
that even for extremely large positive aspects of incumbency advantage, a vote-share
hurdle higher than one-half is socially optimal. In the Appendix, we show the following
Proposition:
Proposition 4
(i) Both candidates R and L oﬀer s∗. The probability of winning the ﬁrst election is
one-half for each candidate.
(ii) s∗ > 1
2
18(iii) s∗ is the ex ante optimal vote-share.
From part (i) of the Proposition, we see that both candidates will oﬀer exactly s∗.13
Part (ii) of the Proposition is a ﬁrst evidence for the fact that the introduction of vote-
share contracts is at least not welfare-reducing from the perspective of the median
voter, as otherwise, he would choose s∗ = 1
2. We will discuss the welfare eﬀects of vote-
share contracts in detail later. Part (iii) of the Proposition shows that the optimal
vote-share threshold, from the perspective of the median voter, is also socially optimal.
Finally, we use ˜ s to denote the vote-share threshold which ensures that the incumbent
will be reelected if and only if his ability is equal to or greater than
γ(cl−ch)
2chcl . Remember
that this is the socially optimal lower ability boarder from equation (10) in Fact 3. By
inserting aR =
γ(cl−ch)
2chcl into condition (28), we obtain










This results immediately in the following Corollary:
Corollary 1
s∗ ≥ ˜ s
Thus, the optimal vote-share choice from the perspective of the median voter is larger
than the vote-share threshold, which ensures that no politician with ability level below
the socially optimal lower boarder has a chance of getting reelected. The reason for
this result is as follows: On the one hand, under the higher vote-share threshold s∗,
politicians will be deselected even if their ability is slightly above the socially optimal
lower boarder. On the other hand, this negative eﬀect is outweighed by the positive
eﬀect of the larger threshold value s∗ on eﬀort. The interaction of these contrarian
forces determines the optimal value s∗.
13Note that in contrast to Gersbach and M¨ uller (2006), there will occur no overpromising here, as
s∗ is the unique optimal point for voters and social welfare is decreasing for higher values than s∗.
Thus, overpromising by oﬀering a threshold above s∗ is not proﬁtable for a candidate, as this would
result in the certain election of his opponent.
196 Welfare Eﬀects
In this section, we analyze the eﬀect of introducing vote-share contracts on public wel-
fare in detail. We compare welfare in a scenario with and without vote-share contracts.
It is intuitively clear that welfare does not change with a threshold sR = 1
2, since a
scenario with a vote-share threshold of one-half is equivalent to the scenario with elec-
tions alone. The introduction of vote-share contracts larger than one-half has three
eﬀects, as shown in Proposition 3: The eﬀort choice in period 1 increases, the expected
ability of a reelected politician increases, while the reelection probability decreases. In
the following, we examine how these three eﬀects inﬂuence expected eﬀort over both
periods, expected ability of the oﬃce-holder in the second period and overall welfare.
6.1 Eﬀects on Expected Eﬀort
We start by analyzing the eﬀect of introducing vote-share contracts on the expected
eﬀort over both periods. We assume that R is elected in period 1 and use E[e∗
2] to
denote the expected eﬀort of the oﬃce-holder in the second period, i.e. the eﬀort of a
reelected incumbent, weighted with his probability of being in oﬃce, plus the eﬀort of












































Analogously, we deﬁne E[e∗V] as expected eﬀort over both periods in the scenario with





































In the Appendix, we show:
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(2 R − 1)(2sR − 1)
4Achcl
(2cl − ch). (22)
(ii) For ch < 2cl, the introduction of vote-share contracts with a threshold value
larger than one-half increases the expected eﬀort over both periods.
(iii) For ch > 2cl the introduction of vote-share contracts with a threshold value larger
than one-half decreases the expected eﬀort over both periods.
Hence, we learn from Proposition 5 that it depends on the relationship of ch and cl
whether the eﬀect of vote-share contracts on the expected eﬀort over both periods is
positive or negative.14 The intuition for this result is as follows: An increasing spread
between ch and cl is bad for the eﬀect of vote-share contracts on expected overall
eﬀort, as the eﬀect of the lower reelection probability under vote-share contracts is
weighted more under larger learning-by-doing eﬀects. Furthermore, the increase in the
ﬁrst period eﬀort, under vote-share threshold, is decreasing in ch, i.e. a higher value of
ch reduces the positive eﬀect of vote-share contracts on the eﬀort in period 1.
From equation (22), we see that a vote-share threshold of 1
2 has no eﬀect on expected
eﬀort and that the (positive or negative) eﬀect of vote-share contracts on expected eﬀort
increases with sR, i.e. a higher threshold increases the absolute value |E[e∗V
R ]−E[e∗
R]|.
6.2 Eﬀects on Expected Ability in Period 2
In this subsection, we analyze the eﬀect of vote-share contracts on the expected ability
of the oﬃce-holder in period 2, given that R chooses e∗
R1 in t = 1. On the one hand,
there is a positive eﬀect of vote-share contracts, as the ability of reelected candidates
is raised. On the other hand, there is a negative eﬀect, as the reelection probability
14Note that the result from Proposition 5 would have to be modiﬁed under the assumption of a
discount factor smaller than 1. Then the introduction of vote-share contracts would have a better
eﬀect on expected eﬀort over both periods, as the lower probability of
γ
2cl being the second period
eﬀort would obtain a minor weight.
21gets smaller. Thus, the probability that a new oﬃce-holder with an expected ability
of zero comes into oﬃce increases. We deﬁne the expected ability of the incumbent in
period 2, given that R chooses e∗









































In an analogical way, we deﬁne E[aV
R(e∗V
R1,e∗V
R1)] in the scenario with vote-share contracts
as the expected ability of the incumbent in the second period given that R chooses e∗V
R1
in the ﬁrst period. In the Appendix, we show:
Fact 6
The eﬀect of introducing vote-share contracts on the expected ability of the incumbent
in the second period, given that the elected politician chooses e∗V






R1)], is given by the following term:
(2 R − 1)(2sR − 1)
4Aγ2
 γ2(ch − cl)
chcl
+ 2f∆ − (2 R − 1)(2sR − 1)
 
. (24)
Thus, a larger spread ch−cl is positive for the eﬀect of vote-share contracts on expected
ability of the incumbent in period 2. There are two intuitive reasons for this result:
• The reelection probability of the incumbent increases if either cl decreases for
given ch or if ch increases for given cl. Thus, the reelection probability increases
with the spread between ch and cl. The positive eﬀect of vote-share contracts on
expected ability, via higher ability of reelected candidates, has relatively more
weight if the reelection probability is higher. Hence, a larger spread between ch
and cl increases the expected ability in period 2.
• The ability of a reelected candidate decreases if either cl decreases for given ch
or if ch increases for given cl. Thus, the ability of a reelected candidate decreases
with the spread between ch and cl. The negative eﬀect of vote-share contracts on
expected ability, via lower reelection probability, has relatively less weight if the
ability of a reelected candidate is lower. Hence, a larger spread between ch and
cl increases the expected ability in period 2.
22From equation (24), we see directly that vote-share contracts with threshold sR = 1
2
have no eﬀect on the expected ability. In the next step, we analyze the eﬀect of vote-
share contracts with threshold s∗ on the expected ability of the incumbent in period
2. In the Appendix, we show:
Proposition 6
(i) For ch > 3
2cl, the introduction of vote-share contracts with threshold s∗ certainly
increases the expected ability of the incumbent in the second period.
(ii) For ch < 3
2cl, the introduction of vote-share contracts with threshold s∗ may
decrease the expected ability of the incumbent in the second period.
Thus, if vote-share contracts with threshold s∗ are applied, the expected ability of
the incumbent in t = 2 is certainly higher than under elections alone if ch > 3
2cl,
i.e., if learning-by-doing eﬀects are not too small. For cl < ch < 3
2cl, it depends
on the other parameter values whether vote-share contracts with threshold s∗ have
positive or negative eﬀects on the expected ability of the oﬃce-holder in period 2.
For f∆ suﬃciently large, the eﬀect of vote-share thresholds on expected ability will
certainly be positive. The reason is that a large value of f∆ means that the ability of
a reelected candidate is smaller than zero and then, the lower reelection probability of
the incumbent is socially beneﬁcial, as a new candidate has an expected ability of zero.
6.3 Total Welfare Eﬀects
In this subsection, we examine the total welfare eﬀects of vote-share contracts in detail.
During this analysis, we will show that vote-share contracts lead to higher welfare than
elections alone, a result that could already be seen in Proposition 4. In the following,
we summarize all eﬀects of vote-share contracts on overall welfare.
• Eﬀects on welfare via eﬀort:
– Vote-share contracts induce a higher eﬀort choice in period 1.
23– Vote-share contracts reduce the expected eﬀort in period 2, as the proba-
bility decreases that the incumbent is reelected. Hence, the probability of
γ
2cl being the second period eﬀort decreases when vote-share contracts are
applied.
• Eﬀects on welfare via ability:
– Vote-share contracts increase the average ability of reelected incumbents.15
– Vote-share contracts reduce the reelection probability of the incumbent,
which means that the probability increases that a new incumbent with an
expected ability of zero comes into oﬃce. This may be positive or negative
for society depending on whether the expected ability of the ﬁrst period
oﬃce-holder is smaller or larger than zero.
Remember that we showed in Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 that it may depend
on the relationship of ch and cl whether introducing vote-share contracts increases or
decreases expected eﬀort and expected ability in period 2. In the following Theorem,
we show that the overall eﬀect of introducing vote-share contracts is welfare-enhancing,
independent of the relationship of ch and cl:
Theorem 1
(i) Welfare under vote-share contracts with a vote-share threshold s∗ is higher than
under elections alone.
(ii) The welfare-enhancing eﬀect of vote-share contracts is increasing in f, ∆ and γ,
it is decreasing in ch and is independent of cl.
Theorem 1 is our main result and is proven in the Appendix. The consequence of the
ﬁrst part is that vote-share contracts lead to higher welfare than standard elections
alone. The second part shows how the welfare-enhancing eﬀect of vote-share contracts
15Thus, vote-share contracts alleviate one ineﬃciency that occurred in the scenario with elections
alone. Note, however, that vote-share contracts cannot avoid all ineﬃciencies, as politicians, once in
oﬃce, will still shift output across time, which is socially wasteful.
24depends on some of the parameters. The intuition for the eﬀect of f and ∆ is as
follows: The average ability level of a reelected candidate is decreasing in f and ∆.
As vote-share contracts decrease the probability of the incumbent to get reelected, the
positive eﬀect of introducing vote-share contracts on total welfare is increasing in f
and ∆.16 The reasons for the other dependences in part (ii) are more subtle, as there
are many channels by which γ, ch and cl get eﬀective on total welfare. These channels
work in opposing directions and, in the case of cl, just outweigh each other.17 Details
of these subtle dependences are omitted here. Nevertheless, we want to point at the
fact that vote-share contracts get, ceteris paribus, more eﬀective if learning-by-doing
eﬀects are relatively small. This result is intuitive, as the aim of vote-share contracts
is to alleviate negative aspects of incumbency advantage. However, thereby, positive
aspects of incumbency advantage, i.e. learning-by-doing eﬀects, are also reduced. If
the positive aspects are rather small, then vote-share contracts cause less damage in
reducing these positive eﬀects and get more eﬀective. Vote-share contracts would be
most eﬀective if there was no learning-by-doing at all, i.e. for ch = cl.
As we showed in the previous two subsections, introducing vote-share contracts in-
creases expected overall eﬀort if ch < 2cl, while introducing vote-share contracts may
decrease expected ability of the oﬃce-holder in period 2 if ch < 3
2cl. Hence, there may
be a trade-oﬀ between the eﬀect on expected overall eﬀort and the eﬀect on expected
ability of the oﬃce-holder in period 2. However, total welfare eﬀects of introducing
vote-share contracts are always positive, independently of ch and cl. The following
four cases may occur, which all yield a positive eﬀect on overall welfare:
(i) For cl < ch ≤ 3
2cl, introducing vote-share contracts increases expected overall
eﬀort, while it may decrease expected ability of the oﬃce-holder in period 2.
However, if there is an ability-decreasing eﬀect, then it is dominated by the
16This means that vote-share contracts become more eﬀective if the socially detrimental output-
shift policies get more harmful. Thus, vote-share contracts mitigate the negative consequences of
output-shift policies, although they are not able to decrease the probability that output-shift policies
occur.
17One reason for the fact that the eﬃciency of vote-share contracts depends on ch, but not on cl,
might be that cl is not contained in the ﬁrst period of the optimization problem.
25eﬀort-increasing eﬀect.
(ii) For 3
2cl < ch < 2cl, introducing vote-share contracts increases both the expected
overall eﬀort and the expected ability of the oﬃce-holder in period 2.
(iii) For ch = 2cl, introducing vote-share contracts has no inﬂuence on expected overall
eﬀort, while it increases expected ability of the oﬃce-holder in period 2.
(iv) For ch > 2cl, introducing vote-share contracts decreases expected overall eﬀort,
while it increases expected ability of the oﬃce-holder in period 2. However, the
ability-increasing eﬀect dominates the eﬀort-decreasing eﬀect.
7 Extensions
In our basic model, we have described the working of vote-share contracts in a simple
setup. In the following, we sketch two fruitful extensions that could be pursued to
address the robustness of our result, i.e. that using vote-share contracts is welfare-
enhancing.
7.1 No Output-shift Policy
First, one variant of our model is to assume that the socially wasteful output-shift
policy is not available for the incumbent, i.e. to set ∆ equal to zero. This assumption
enables us to analyze potential risks of using vote-share thresholds in the case where the
incumbency advantage may only have positive eﬀects on welfare. As one can see from
Fact 5 and Theorem 1, under absence of output-shift policy, s∗ will be lower and the
welfare-increasing eﬀect of vote-share contracts on welfare will be smaller. However,
even for ∆ = 0, welfare under vote-share contracts with vote-share threshold s∗ will
be higher than under elections alone. The intuition for this result is that vote-share
contracts will still be welfare-enhancing, as they result in higher expected eﬀort and/or
in higher expected ability of the oﬃce-holder in the second period.
267.2 Asymmetric Competition and Larger Time Horizon
A useful extension of the model is to consider two candidates who are ex ante non-
symmetric. There are several possibilities to introduce ex ante asymmetry, e.g. by
diﬀering eﬀort-cost parameters in the ﬁrst term of a politician or by abandoning the
assumption of symmetric ideal points concerning the ideological policy. If, for example,
 R is located closer to the ideal point of the median voter than  L, i.e.  L < 1 −  R,
then candidate R will have an ex ante advantage over his opponent L. Analyzing
the consequences of such an asymmetric competition for oﬃce in t = 1 on the eﬀort
choice, on the incumbency advantage in t = 2, and on the welfare-eﬀects of vote-share
contracts promises to be a fruitful extension of our model.
Moreover, a model with two periods and two candidates being already asymmetric
before the ﬁrst period starts may also be interpreted as the last two periods in a game
with a longer time-horizon. The ex-ante asymmetry would then have been initiated by
the incumbency advantage in previous periods of this repeated game. Such a model
with a larger time horizon, where candidates for public oﬃce compete in each term
on the basis of vote-share contracts, might be an interesting extension. First, this
would make the model much more applicable for real-world situations, whereas our
basic model with just two periods covers, in principle, only the case of two-period term
limits, as common in the U.S. presidential elections. Second, we assume that increasing
the time horizon of the model would reinforce the positive result of our basic model.
For a detailed solution of a multi-period model, it would be necessary to specify the
assumptions about learning-by-doing eﬀects, i.e. to make precise assumptions whether
they occur in each term, only sometimes, or even only once. However, we may state
the following, even without precise assumptions about the multi-period model: As the
incumbent will work hard to get reelected, the eﬀort choice under vote-share contracts
will be higher with vote-share contracts in each period, except from the last. The
lower expected eﬀort in the last period will be weighted less if there are more than two
periods. Thus, we conjecture that the welfare-improving eﬀect of vote-share thresholds
27will even be higher in dynamic versions of our model.
8 Conclusion
In a simple model frame, we have proposed to use vote-share contracts as an instru-
ment for restraining incumbency advantage. Vote-share contracts imply higher eﬀort
and/or higher ability of incumbents, and therefore improve the eﬃciency of political
systems. However, the practical implementation of vote-share contracts might induce
further consequences, which might reduce or even invert the positive eﬀect of vote-share
contracts. Nevertheless, we have shown that under the assumptions of our framework,
it is optimal for societies to restrain the incumbency advantage of their oﬃce-holders,
even if there exists a socially beneﬁcial aspect of incumbency advantage.
One may wonder why politicians do not already use other methods today to restrain
their incumbency advantage. If a politician can increase his chances to win the ﬁrst
election by cutting his future incumbency advantage, then one should expect politicians
to make use of this mechanism in practice. A politician might, for example, announce
he will spend less money for his reelection campaign in order to reduce his incumbency
advantage. At ﬁrst glance, this would have the same eﬀect as a vote-share threshold
above one-half. The problem is, however, that such announcements are no credible
commitments, as they are not enforceable by voters. Thus, such announcements are
completely worthless. The only way to avoid that announcements are just cheap talk
is to embed them into the framework of enforceable political contracts. The most
suitable kind of political contract to reduce welfare losses which arise from incumbency
advantages are vote-share thresholds. Thus, we believe that exploring the potential of
vote-share contracts as a new institution may be a fruitful path for liberal democracies.
28Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Part (i) is obvious. Next, the problem of politician R in his second term is given by
max
eR2
{γ(eR2 + aR) − cle
2
R2},
which yields eR2 =
γ
2cl. For politician R in his ﬁrst term, the problem is given by
max
eR2
{E[γ(eR2 + aR)] − che
2
R2}.
The solution is eR2 =
γ
2ch. This yields the second part. Finally, note for part (iii) that













4cl + γaR, while the corresponding utility for an oﬃce













Proof of Fact 2
It is optimal for the median voter i = 1
2 to reelect R if this implies that his utility in





+ (aR + eR1 − ˆ e1)
 












where we have applied that upon observing g1, the median voter expects the ability
level of R to be
g1








Condition (25) states that R is reelected if his ability level is equal or above the critical
level −ǫR
f∆
γ − eR1 + ˆ e1 +
γ(cl−ch)
2chcl . Now let us look at R’s decision about ǫR:
• For aR ≥ −eR1+ˆ e1+
γ(cl−ch)
2chcl , R is reelected even with ǫR = 0. As aR is uniformly
distributed on [−A;A], the probability for aR > −eR1 + ˆ e1 +
γ(cl−ch)
2chcl is given by
p0(eR1, ˆ e1) = 1
2 + 1
2A(eR1 − ˆ e1 −
γ(cl−ch)
2chcl ).
29• If −eR1+ˆ e1+
γ(cl−ch)




γ , then it is optimal to choose
ǫR = 1, which prevents the oﬃceholder from being dismissed. The probability of
aR being within this interval is given by
f∆
2Aγ.




γ , the ability of R is too low for him to become
reelected and he will choose ǫR = 0 to avoid losses from output-shift policies.
Finally, we obtain the expected ability level of R, conditional on the fact that he is




γ and A, which is given








Proof of Proposition 2
Together with equations (3), (4), and (5), the maximization problem (6) yields the
following ﬁrst-order condition:





























































We obtain part (ii) - (iv) by using the fact that ˆ e1 = eR1 will hold in equilibrium.
Proof of Fact 3
Under a socially optimal reelection rule, voters should reelect R if the expected utility
from the public project in period 2 is not smaller when R remains in oﬃce than under



















4chcl as the optimal average ability
level of a reelected candidate.
Proof of Fact 4
The derivation of (12), (13), and (14) is similar to the derivation of (3), (4), and (5).
With sR > 1
2, R is reelected only if all voters i ≥ 1 − sR prefer him, as he needs at
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+ ǫRf∆ − ( R − (1 − sR))
2 ≥ γe
∗V
L2 − ( L − (1 − sR))
2.















The right-hand side of this inequality gives the minimum ability R must have to be
reelected. This minimum ability is increasing in sR. With condition (28), it is straight-
forward to show that (3), (4), and (5) generalize to (12), (13), and (14).
Proof of Proposition 3
The problem of the incumbent is the same as in Proposition 2, except that we have to
use equations (12), (13), and (14) instead of (3), (4), and (5). The ﬁrst-order condition
of the maximization problem (6) is given by
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31In equilibrium, ˆ e1 = eR1 must hold. Hence, the equilibrium eﬀort e∗V


















Proof of Fact 5
We insert equations (15), (16), and (17) into the maximization problem (18), and use
the fact that aV
L = 0. This yields the following ﬁrst-order condition:
(2 R − 1)γ
2Ach
−
(2 R − 1)
Aγ

























4ch(2µR−1). Finally, the second derivative with
respect to sR is negative, which proves that s∗ maximizes equation (18).
Proof of Proposition 4





according to our assumption 2 R − 1 < Aγ. The incumbent will exert eﬀort high
enough to sustain his reelection chances, as b is suﬃciently large. Deviation from s∗
to a higher or a lower vote-share threshold yields the election of the opponent, as the
median voter prefers the oﬀer s∗. Hence, deviation is not proﬁtable. Uniqueness of
s∗ follows in the same way. If k chooses sk  = s∗, then k′ certainly wins the election
by choosing sk′ = s∗. Part (ii) is obvious. For part (iii), we observe that any other
vote-share threshold reduces the expected utility from public projects, as citizens are
homogeneous regarding P. Furthermore, due to equation (2), aggregate utility from the
ideological project does not depend on which candidate is elected. Thus, the optimal
vote-share threshold, from the perspective of the median voter, is ex ante optimal.
32Proof of Proposition 5
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Subtracting equation (29) from equation (30) yields, after some straightforward algebra
E[e
∗V
R ] − E[e
∗
R] =
(2 R − 1)(2sR − 1)
4Achcl
(2cl − ch).
This gives part (i). Part (ii) and part (iii) follow directly from equation 22.
Proof of Fact 6
We use the fact that the expected ability of a new left-wing oﬃce-holder in period 2
is equal to zero and insert the values from (7), (8) and (9) into equation (23). After


































































(2 R − 1)(2sR − 1)f∆
2Aγ2
+
(2 R − 1)(2sR − 1)(ch − cl)
4Achcl
−
(2 R − 1)2(2sR − 1)2
4Aγ2 (32)
as the expected ability of the incumbent in the second period with vote-share contracts,
given that the elected politician chooses e∗V
R1 in the ﬁrst period. From equation (31)













(2 R − 1)(2sR − 1)
4Aγ2
 γ2(ch − cl)
chcl
+ 2f∆ − (2 R − 1)(2sR − 1)
 
.
Proof of Proposition 6
We insert s∗
R from Fact 5 into equation (24). Hereby, we have to distinguish two
separate cases: The case where 1
2 < s∗
R < 1 and the case where s∗
R = 1.
First, in the case where s∗































Second, in the case where s∗
R = 1, we insert s∗













2 R − 1
4Aγ2





Furthermore, note that we know from Fact 5 that in the case s∗
R = 1 the following
inequality has to hold:

















2 R − 1
4Aγ2  





The results of equation (33) and (36) together imply Proposition 6.
Proof of Theorem 1
Part (i): Suppose, without loss of generality, that candidate R is elected in the ﬁrst
election. Applying vote-share contracts will be welfare-enhancing if and only if the wel-
fare, under vote-share contracts and with a vote-share threshold s∗
R minus the welfare
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35After some tedious calculation18, we obtain the following expression:
γ2
ch
+ 2f∆ − (2 R − 1)(2s
∗
R − 1) > 0 (37)
In the next step, we insert s∗
R from Fact 5 into condition (37), and show that condition
(37) is always fulﬁlled, which proves the welfare-enhancing eﬀect of vote-share contracts
with vote-share threshold s∗
R. We have to analyze two separate cases: First, the case
where 1
2 < s∗
R < 1, and second, the case where s∗
R = 1.
If s∗






R in condition (37) and obtain
γ2
2ch
+ f∆ > 0. (38)
This condition is always fulﬁlled.
In the case where s∗
R = 1, we insert s∗
R = 1 in condition (37) and obtain
γ2
ch
+ 2f∆ − (2 R − 1) > 0. (39)
Furthermore, we use the fact that for s∗





2(2 R − 1)
+
γ2
4ch(2 R − 1)
≥ 1 (40)




≥ 2(2 R − 1) (41)
and, by inserting this inequality into condition (39), we immediately see that condition
(39) is always fulﬁlled.
Part(ii): The second part of the Theorem follows directly from condition (38), where
the term f∆+
γ2
2ch represents the gains that accrue from the introduction of vote-share
contracts.
18In our calculations, we use the fact that s∗
R > 1
2, which allows us to divide by (2s∗
R − 1).
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